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Abstrat
The aim of this work is to provide a unied
framework for ordinal representations of un-
ertainty lying at the rossroads between pos-
sibility and probability theories. Suh on-
dene relations between events are ommonly
found in nonmonotoni reasoning, inonsis-
teny management, or qualitative deision
theory. They start either from probability
theory, making it more qualitative, or from
possibility theory, making it more expres-
sive. We show these two trends onverge to a
lass of genuine probability relations, numeri-
ally representable, that umulate features of
probability and possibility theories. We pro-
vide haraterization results for these useful
tools that preserve the qualitative nature of
possibility rankings, while enjoying the power
of expressivity of additive representations.
1 Introdution
Comparative probability emerged in the thirties with
the works of Ramsey, Koopman and De Finetti (see the
anthology edited by Kyburg and Smokler, 1980) with
a view to provide subjetivist foundations to probabil-
ity theory. Under this view, the notion of belief, ex-
pressed in terms of probability, is omparative prior to
being numerial, numerial probabilities being a mat-
ter of measurement of a basially ordinal notion. In the
last twenty years, the modelling of relative belief has
been often enountered in the knowledge representa-
tion and reasoning literature under the form of a non-
probabilisti relation on a set of propositions or events.
This is learly the ase with the nonmonotoni reason-
ing literature espeially the so-alled preferential mod-
els and inferene (Shoham 1988, Lehmann and Magi-
dor 1992, Boutilier 1994, Friedman and Halpern 1996),
and the related eld of belief revision (see e.g. Rott
2001). In both elds, the ondene relation turned
out to be losely related to the omparative possibil-
ity relation (see e.g. Lewis (1973) or Dubois (1986)).
And indeed the axiomati framework of Lehmann and
Magidor as well as the axioms of belief revision en-
fore the existene of a possibility relation or a family
thereof, ordering the set of propositions in terms of
relative belief or epistemi entrenhment.
A partiularly typial feature of these possibility order-
ings and their relatives is the following: they embed a
idea of negligibility, rst stressed by Lehmann (1996).
If a proposition A is more plausible than B and also
more plausible than C, then A is more plausible than
the disjuntion of B and C. It means that the plausi-
bility of B and that of C are of a muh lower order of
magnitude than the one of A.
The strong onit existing between probability the-
ory and belief strutures deriving from the knowledge
representation and reasoning perspetive has led to
a rebuttal of nonmonotoni reasoning, based on the
lottery paradox (Kyburg, 1988, Poole, 1991). How-
ever Paul Snow (1999) and others (Benferhat et al,
1999) showed that possibility and probability stru-
tures were not totally inonsistent with eah other.
They ould lay bare a speial kind of regular proba-
bility measures displaying the negligibility properties:
linear big-stepped probabilities. On the other hand, as
notied in Dubois et al. (1998), Fargier and Sabbadin
(2003), possibility relations an be usefully rened by
lexiographi shemes and suh renements reover all
properties of probability relations.
The aim of this paper is to provide a unied frame-
work for ordinal representations of unertainty lying
at the rossroads between possibility and probability
theories. We an then start either from probability
theory, making it more qualitative, or from possibility
theory, making it more expressive. We show these two
trends onverge to a lass of genuine probability re-
lations, numerially representable, alled big-stepped
probabilities, that umulate features of probability and
possibility theories. We thus build a bridge between
ordinal belief strutures, possibility and probability,
by providing a framework that ombines additivity and
negligibility, thus organizing the existing onepts into
a lear setting. This approah preserves the qualita-
tive nature of possibility rankings, while enjoying the
power of expressivity of additive representations.
Setion 2 present a minimal ordinal setting for rep-
resenting omparative ondene in events, that an
serve for both probabilisti and possibilisti represen-
tations. Setion 3 provides examples of ondene re-
lations found in the literature, that bridge the gap be-
tween the additivity of probability theory and the neg-
ligibility eet at work in possibility theory. Setion
4 presents axiom systems that lead to these relations.
Proofs are omitted for the sake of brevity.
2 An Ordinal Setting for Condene
Relations
2.1 Condene Funtions and Relations
Condene in events an be modelled by a monotone
set-funtion on S , that is, a mapping  dened from
2
S
to [0; 1℄ suh that:
  (;) = 0, (S) = 1,
  8A;B  S;A  B =) (A)  (B)
We will all these funtions ondene funtions
1
.
Important sublasses of ondene funtions are prob-
ability and possibility/neessity measures. These mea-
sures are simple beause the set-funtions omparing
the relative likelihood of events are ompletely deter-
mined by the knowledge of the degrees of ondene
in states (either a probability distribution p or a pos-
sibility distribution  on S):
  P (A) =
P
s2A
p(s),
  (A) = max
s2A
(s), N(A) = 1 max
s2

A
(s)
A more general approah is to use a relation that om-
pares propositions in terms of the relative ondene
an agent possesses about them. The basi properties
of ondene measures extend to suh partial relations
we all ondene relations (Dubois et al. 2003) :
Denition 1 Let  be a relation on 2
S
,  its sym-
metri part,  its asymmetri part.  is a ondene
relation i it is:
1
They have been given various names suh as apaities
(Choquet), fuzzy measures (Sugeno) or plausibility mea-
sures (Halpern) in various domains. The latter denomina-
tion suits ondene modelling but ould be onfused with
Shafer's plausibilities that have a more preise meaning,
as a weak ounterpart to the notion of belief { they are
partiular monotone set-funtions. The term "ondene
funtion" intends to avoid ambiguity and remain open
  Reexive: 8A;A  A
  Non trivial: S  ;
  Consistent: 8A;S  A and A  ;
  Quasi-transitive: A  B and B  C =) A  C
  Monotoni ("orderly" after Halpern, 1997):
8A;B;C  S:
A  B ) A[C  B and A  B[C ) A  B
If  is moreover a weak order (i.e. is omplete and
transitive), it is alled a ondene weak order.
The monotony of  implies the one of ; impor-
tantly, it also implies the ordinal ounterpart to the
set-funtion monotoniity:
Proposition 1 If  on 2
S
is a monotoni ondene
relation then 8A;B;C  S:
  A  B ) A [ C  B, A  B [ C ) A  B
  A  B ) B  A
Any apaity obviously denes a ondene weak or-
der and onversely: A 

B () (A)  (B). But
not all ondene relations an be represented by a
ondene funtion. It may be so beause the relation
is not omplete (some events may be not ompara-
ble), as for instane generalized qualitative probabili-
ties (Lehmann 1996) or that the indierene relation
indued by relation  is not transitive. It aounts for
some indistinguishability threshold in the pereption
of relative ondene by an agent. Two events may be
delared as equally likely beause the pereption of the
agent is oarse. Then, ondene levels are subjet to
Poinare paradox: one may have A  B;B  C, but
A  C. Moreover, some of the ondene relations
that naturally pop up in our framework are naturally
quasi-transitive.
2.2 CP-Relations and OM-Relations
Condene funtions and relations distinguish two im-
portant but generally inompatible properties: pread-
ditivity on the one hand, that ensures that events are
ompared "eteris paribus", and negligibility on the
other hand, that is the peuliarity of many qualitative
representation frameworks of AI (e.g. possibility rela-
tions, kappa funtions, Lehmann's generalized proba-
bilities, innitesimal probabilities, and the like).
Denition 2 (Preadditivity) A relation  on 2
S
is
preadditive i it satises the following axiom:
ADD: 8A;B;C  S suh that A \ (B [ C) = ;:
B  C , A [ B  A [ C.
The rationale behind this property, rst requested by
De Finetti, is lear: the part ommon to sets A [ C
and A [ B should be immaterial for their omparison
in terms of relative ondene. It was introdued as
the natural ounterpart to the additivity property of
probability funtions (see e.g. Fishburn, 1986). In the
same way, we an dene CP-relations as a generaliza-
tion of omparative probabilities:
Denition 3 A omparative probability relation is a
transitive, omplete and preadditive monotoni on-
dene relation.
A eteris paribus ondene relation (or CP-relation
for short) is a preadditive ondene relation.
For instane, the partial ordering of events generated
by a family of probabilities F : A  B i P (A) 
P (B);8P 2 F is a (non-omplete) CP-relation.
Notie that omparative probabilities are more general
than the relations indued by usual probability mea-
sures, as shown by Kraft's et al. (1959) ounterexam-
ple. In addition to probability measures, omparative
probabilities enompass relations not representable by
a lassial probability, only by means of speial lasses
of belief funtions. This is why we all the property in
Denition 2 preadditivity.
The seond notieable property is Negligibility, that
usually omes along with Closeness, thus omparing
events on the basis of their orders of magnitude:
Denition 4 A monotoni relation  on 2
S
is an or-
der of magnitude ondene relation (OM-relation) i
strit part satises the negligibility axiom:
Axiom NEG: 8A;B;C  S, pairwise disjoint sets,
A  B and A  C =) A  B [ C
and its symmetri part is a loseness relation i.e., it
satises
Axiom CLO: 8A;B;C  S
A  B and (A  C or A  C) =) A  B [ C.
An event is lose to another i their plausibilities have
the same order of magnitude: a set is obviously lose
to itself, and to any union of sets of the same order of
magnitude. Contrary to loseness, negligibility deals
with disjoint sets. Axiom NEG states that, if B and C
are negligible w.r.t. A, then so is also B[C. This fea-
ture looks quite ounterintuitive in probabilisti terms,
but is at the foundation of many unertainty frame-
works proposed by AI e.g. kappa or possibility fun-
tions and similar models. It makes sense in the sope
of nonmonotoni reasoning and belief revision where
the notion of belief is often interpreted as tentatively
aepted belief until new information is available. In
belief revision theory (e.g. Rott, 2001) belief sets are
dedutively losed, and thus the onjuntion of two
beliefs is a belief. This requirement makes sense for
aepted beliefs, and is used in the preferential infer-
ene approah to nonmonotoni reasoning (Kraus et
al, 1990). It is preisely this requirement that enfores
the idea of negligibility in the underlying model of rel-
ative belief (Dubois et al 2004). The losure under
onjuntion leads to the following axiom (Dubois and
Prade, 1995, Friedman and Halpern 1996):
Axiom CCS: 8A;B;C pairwise disjoint subsets of S,
A [ C  B and A [ B  C =) A  B [ C
Axiom CCS also alled "union property" by Halpern
(1997). We ould use it to enfore negligibility (Dubois
et al. 2004). But NEG is atually less demanding
than CCS and already expresses negligibility. Halpern
(1997) also strengthens the CCS axiom thus into
"Qualitativeness" axiom:
Axiom QUAL: 8A;B;C  S,
A [ C  B and A [ B  C =) A  B [ C
QUAL is a very strong ondition, sine it not only
implies CO, NEG and its extension to non disjoint
sets, but also the transitivity of . In Denition 4,
we propose to build order of magnitude relations on
weaker requirements.
Typial examples of negligibility relations are ompar-
ative possibilities (Lewis, 1973) and omparative ne-
essities, that use a totally ordered sale of magnitude:
Denition 5 A omparative possibility (resp. nees-
sity) is a ondene weak order 

suh that:
8A;B;C  S; (B 

C =) A [B 

A [ C)
(resp. A [B 
N
A [ C =) B 
N
C)
Possibility orderings have been studied by Grove
(1988) in the sope of belief revision. Interestingly, it
has been shown (Dubois, 1986) that omparative pos-
sibility relations are equivalently represented by the
orresponding set-funtions and thus derive both from
a weak order 

on states only. Intuitively s 

s
0
means that state s is at least as plausible, normal,
expeted as state s
0
. The main idea behind this mod-
elling is that the state of the world is always believed
to be as normal as possible, negleting less normal
states. It presupposes that when assessing the om-
parative plausibility of events, an agent fouses on the
most normal situations and neglets other less plausi-
ble ones.
Comparative possibilities are OM-relations: possibil-
ity levels purely express orders of magnitude of plausi-
bility. But omparative neessities are not. The lose-
ness property is indeed not satised (sine e.g. N(A) =
; andN(B) = ; does not imply N(A[B) = ;). Nees-
sity relations express omparative levels of ertainty or
belief (a notion stronger than plausibility).
Our rst result is that negligibility is not ompatible
with preadditivity exept in very partiular ases:
Theorem 1 If  is both a omparative probability and
satises CLO, then there exists a permutation of the
elements of S suh that:
fs
1
g  fs
2
g  : : : fs
k
g  ; and fs
k+1
g  fs
k+2
g 
    fs
n
g  ;
If  is both a omparative probability and satises
NEG, then there exists a permutation of the elements
of S suh that:
fs
1
g  fs
2
g  : : : fs
k
g  fs
k+1
g  fs
k+2
g 
fs
k+3
g  ; and fs
k+4
g      fs
n
g  ;
Stronger variants of this theorem appear in Dubois et
al. (2003, 2004). So, requiring preadditivity within
possibility theory, or equivalently, requiring that a
omparative probability reets order of magnitude
reasoning leaves little room: either possibility relations
based on linear distributions, or, whih is equivalent,
linear big-stepped probabilities (i.e. probability fun-
tions suh that there exists a permutation of the states
where 8i; P (fs
i
g) >
P
j>i
P (fs
j
g). In partiular it
means that two states of the world annot be equally
plausible. Families of suh linear orders are at work in
the nonmonotoni System P of Kraus et al., 1990 (see
Benferhat et al., 1999).
One may wonder whether there exist ondene re-
lations that umulate the advantages of preadditivity
and the qualitativeness of order of magnitude reason-
ing. The question is not so paradoxial as it may seem
to be: Setion 3 shows preadditive relations esaping
Theorem 1 by relaxing one of its onditions, namely
either the transitivity of the ondene relation or the
sope of the negligibility and loseness axioms.
3 Examples of Preadditive Relations
Involving Negligibility
In this setion, we start from possibility relations and
try to extend their disrimination power by injeting
preadditivity. Two events A and B may fail to be
disriminated using the dual pair (
N
;

) as soon as
A 

B and A 
N
B, (this is the so-alled "drowning
eet"). A 

B may be due to a high plausibility of
A \ B. However following the preadditivity property
A\B should not aet the omparison between A and
B, this set being ommon to both. The same reasoning
applies to

A\

B with respet to the equality A 
N
B.
In the spirit of probability theory, only

B\A and B\

A
should matter in telling A from B.
3.1 Disrimax Possibilisti Likelihood
Hopefully, there exits a preadditive renement of both

N
and 

, where events are ompared only with
respet to their disjoint part:
Denition 6 (Dubois et al. 1998) Let 

be a
omparative possibility relation on 2
S
. The disrimax
likelihood relation (denoted 
L
) is dened as follows:
8A;B 2 2
S
; A 
L
B () A \

B 


A \ B
This kind of onstrut an be found in many works
(surveyed in (Halpern, 1997)) mainly for the purpose
of ordering onsistent subsets of formulas from a pri-
oritized knowledge base, in the sope of nonmonotoni
reasoning and inonsisteny management. It also ap-
pears as the only rational Savagean model of uner-
tainty under the assumption of a purely ordinal eval-
uation of deisions (Dubois et al, 2003)

L
is obviously a CP-relation. The omparison of
two events is purely ordinal and is very simply ob-
tained from a possibility distribution. Indeed:
A 
L
B () max
s2A\

B
(s)  max
s2

A\B
(s)
The latter formulation motivates the name "dis-
rimax", short for "maximal plausibility on disrim-
inating sets". 
L
is akin to an OM-relation in the
following sense:
Proposition 2 The restrition of 
L
to disjoint
events is an OM-relation, i.e. for A;B;C pairwise
disjoint sets:
A 
L
B and A 
L
C ) A 
L
B [ C
A 
L
B and (A 
L
C or A 
L
C) ) A 
L
B [ C
Like omparative probabilities, disrimax likelihood is
preadditive and thus esapes the main drawbak of
possibility theory (the drowning eet). But it stays
fully ompatible with the possibilisti framework sine
it renes both 

and 
N
: when A is stritly more
possible (or more neessary) than B, it is also judged
more likely than B. Formally :
Proposition 3 (Dubois et al., 1998)
A 

B =) A 
L
B; A 
N
B =) A 
L
B
A \ B = ; =) (A 
L
B () A 

B)
But it may happen that, whereas A and B are equally
possible (resp. neessary) sine relying on the same
very possible states (resp. exluding the same impos-
sible states), the former is judged more likely than the
seond, beause, apart from these ommon elements,
the possibility of B \

A is far lower than the one of A.
It should also be notied that 
L
is quasi-transitive:
its strit part is transitive, but it may happen that
A 
L
B, B 
L
C whereas A 
L
C. This is due to
the fat that A \ B = ; and B \ C = ; do not imply
A \ C = ;.
3.2 Big-Stepped Probabilities
This seond model (Dubois et al., 1998; Fargier and
Sabbadin, 2003) is partiularly appealing, in the sense
that it proposes a form of omparative probability
ompatible with possibility theory:
Denition 7 A probability measure P is said to be
big-stepped i:
8s 2 S; P (fsg) > P (fs
0
s.t. P (fs
0
g) < P (fsg)g)
i.e., for any s, p(s) >
P
s
0
s.t. p(s
0
)<p(s)
p(s
0
):
It means that grouping together states of probabil-
ity lower than the probability of a presribed state
does not form an event more probable than this state.
Aording to this denition, any probability measure
dened by a uniform distribution on S is formally big-
stepped sine the ondition vauously holds. Whether
this probability is genuinely big-stepped is a matter of
disussion, but it is a limit ase thereof. This denition
also generalizes the linear big-stepped probabilities of
(Snow 1999, Benferhat et al. 1999) whih are reov-
ered when one moreover assumes that non null states
are never equiprobable. The purely ordinal denition
goes as follows:
Denition 8 A omparative probability 
P
is big-
stepped i: 8s 2 S; fsg 
P
fs
0
s.t. fsg 
P
fs
0
gg.
A big-stepped omparative probability relation is al-
ways representable by a numerial (big-stepped) prob-
ability measure. Orderings of events indued by big-
stepped probabilities are enountered in the AI litera-
ture. First, they have muh in ommon with Spohn's
  funtions (1988): disbelief degrees provided by a
 funtion an indeed be interpreted as the order of
magnitude of a non-standard probability (Pearl, 1993;
Giang and Shenoy 1999) | the latter non-standard
probability is atually a big-stepped probability.
Big-stepped probabilities are fully ompatible with
possibility theory, in the sense that they rene dis-
rimax possibilisti likelihood relations, hene possi-
bility/neessity measures as well:
Proposition 4 Let  be a possibility distribution and
p a probability distribution suh that (s)  (s
0
) ()
p(s)  p(s
0
). If P is a big-stepped probability then:
A 
L
B =) A 
P
B.
Indeed eah luster of equally probable states or-
responds to a lass of equipossible states, that is,
equipossibility leads to equiprobability. When the pos-
sibility distribution on states is linear, the relations in-
dued by big-stepped probabilities oinide with dis-
rimax possibilisti likelihood relations. In the ase
of a uniform possibility distribution, the big-stepped
probability is a regular uniform probability and the
strit part of the disrimax possibilisti likelihood re-
lation oinides with proper set-inlusion. Conversely,
it is very easy to build the possibilisti struture that
underlies a big-stepped probability:
Proposition 5 Let P be a big-stepped probability.
Then, there exists a possibility distribution , ordinally
equivalent to p and suh that A 

B =) A 
P
B.
So, when an event is more possible (or more ertain)
than another, it is also more probable. But there
are some equi-possible (resp. equi-neessary) events
that are distinguished by the big-stepped probability,
preisely those that suer from the drowning eet:
when the most plausible states realizing the two events
are equally likely, they anel eah other in a pair-
wise manner, and the omparison boils down to the
omparison of the remaining states. Finally, if A has
more most plausible states than B then A is onsidered
more likely. When the events have the same number
of states of highest plausibility, the omparison then
fouses on the seond plausibility level, et.
This mode of omparison is losely related to the lex-
iographi omparison of vetors alled leximax:
Denition 9 (Leximax ordering) Let (L;) be an
ordered sale,
~
U;
~
V two vetors of a spae L
N
, and 
a permutation that ranks a vetor by dereasing order
( 8~w 2 L
N
; w
(1)
     w
(N)
:
~
U 
leximax
~
V ()
9k 2 [1; N ℄, u
(i)
= v
(i)
for i < k and u
(k)
> v
(k)
.
Now, let pl : S ! [0; 1℄ be a distribution { e.g. a prob-
ability p, or a possibility distribution { enoding any
ondene weak order on S, and all
~
A
pl
the ondene
vetor of A (a
i
= pl(s
i
) if s
i
2 A, a
i
= 0 otherwise).
Theorem 2 If P is a big-stepped probability, then
8A;B 2 2
S
; P (A)  P (B) ()
~
A
p

leximax
~
B
p
(for pl = p). Conversely, when S is nite, 8pl,
there exists a big-stepped probability suh that 8A;B 2
2
S
;
~
A
pl

leximax
~
B
pl
() P (A)  P (B).
Sine based on probabilities, big-stepped probabilities
are obviously additive. But the numerial values are
immaterial for haraterizing the orresponding on-
dene relation. Only the ondene ordering of states
matters, whih onrms the ordinal nature of suh
omparative probabilities. Big-stepped probabilities
satisfy the negligibility axiom only partially. Indeed,
A an be more probable than B for two dierent rea-
sons: either B is negligible in front of A, or they are
lose to eah other, i.e. their most probable states
share the same probability, and then the dierene is
made by ounting the number of states in the levels.
Only the restrition of the relation to events that are
not lose to eah other satises NEG. But axiom CLO
is not satised for big-stepped probabilities.
Moreover, big-stepped probabilities form a spe-
ial lass of lexiographi probabilities in the sense
of (Blume et al., 1991; Lehmann 1998). Let
S
1
; S
2
; : : : ; S
n
be a well-ordered partition of S. A lex-
iographi probability is a probability funtion whose
restrition to events in the subalgebra generated by
S
1
; S
2
; : : : ; S
n
is a linear big-stepped probability. It
generates a possibility ordering on subsets made of
union of S
i
's. But the subsets of eah S
i
are ordered by
a regular probability. In other terms, a lexiographi
probability ordering is a probability funtion suh that
8s 2 S
i
;8A  S
i+1
[    [ S
n
; p(s) > P (A). Notie
that the restrition that all the states within a single
luster S
i
are equiprobable is dropped here and that
big-stepped probabilities are reovered when the lat-
ter assumption is added. The idea of assigning prob-
abilities to equipossible states, was also suggested by
Boutilier (1994). Lexiographi probabilities obey the
axioms of so-alled generalized qualitative probabili-
ties of Lehmann(1996), that are not supposed to be
omplete, and display negligibility eets.
Any disrimax likelihood relation indued by a possi-
bility ordering of states 

an also be generated by a
family of lexiographi probability funtions F sharing
the same well-ordered partition indued by equipossi-
ble states. It is then easy to see that A 
L
B i
P (A) > P (B);8P 2 F .
4 Charaterizing Condene Relations
that Exhibit Negligibility Eets
The ore of the haraterization of the relations of Se-
tion 3 is based on the assumption that, in a qualitative
framework, the relation between states generates the
whole relation among events { basially the one based
on the order of magnitude of the states.
4.1 OM-relation indued by a
quasi-transitive ordering of states
Halpern (1997) studied in detail the proess of lifting a
relation from elements of a set to its subsets, assuming
a partial (pre)ordering 3 of states. Let us slightly en-
large these original assumptions: rstly, we start from
a relation on S [f;g, so as to allow the representation
of impossible states, and seondly we do not assume
the transitivity of 3 but only its quasi-transitivity:
Denition 10 A basi ondene relation (basi re-
lation, for short) is a reexive and quasi-transitive re-
lation 3 on S [ f;g that is:
onsistent: 8s; s 3 ;
non trivial : 9s; ; 3 s does not hold.
These assumptions ome up naturally in the setting of
ondene relations. Indeed:
Proposition 6 Any ondene relation  indues a
basi ondene relation 3: s 3 s
0
, fsg  fs
0
g.
The basi relation orresponds to Halpern's ordering
when it is supposed that 8s; s  ; and, more impor-
tantly, that  is fully transitive (here, we only assume
the transitivity of its strit part). Following Halpern,
we dene the strit ondene relation by:
AB () 8s
0
2 B; 9s 2 A; s 3 s
0
but not s
0
3 s.
But, ontrary to (Halpern 1997) we do not use the
same priniple to build the symmetri part: sine the
full transitivity of 3 is not assumed here, it would lead
to ounterintuitive results. Here, we simply dene the
symmetri part by ompleting  :
A
:
= B () not(AB) and not(B A))
AB () AB or A
:
= B
Then the ondene relation  on events is said to be
simply generated by the basi relation 3.
Notie that AB is omplete by denition. When 3
is also omplete, the previous lifting priniple implies:
AB () 8s
0
2 B; 9s 2 A; s  s
0
A
:
= B () 9s
a
2 A; s
b
2 B;8s 2 A;8s
0
2 B;
s
a
3 s
0
and s
b
3 s
Denition 11 A relation  on 2
S
is said to be on-
sistent with a basi ondene relation 3 on S i:
8s;
0
s 2 S; fsg fs
0
g () s 3 s
0
; fsg ; () s  ;:
When 3 is omplete (and quasi-transitive), as it is the
ase in eah of the formalisms we aim at harateriz-
ing, it an be shown that there is only one OM-relation
onsistent with it, and that it is preisely the one de-
sribed the previous lifting priniple.
Theorem 3 Let 3 be a omplete basi relation. The
following propositions are equivalent:
   is an OM-relation onsistent with 3 ;
   is simply generated by 3.
So, AB when the order of magnitude of eah state of
B is lower than the order of magnitude of some state
in A and A
:
= B when the most plausible elements of
A and B share the same order of magnitude.
The ase when the OM-relation is a weak order, is
obviously a haraterization of omparative possibility.
Theorem 4 Let  be a monotoni ondene rela-
tion. The following properties are equivalent:
  9 suh that 8A;B  S;A  B () A 

B;
   is a omplete and transitive OM-relation.
Finally, we also onjeture that, when 3 is not om-
plete,  is the least rened in the lass of omplete
OM-relations in agreement 3. In this ase, A  B i
it is expliitly stated by 3 (when A is a singleton) or
when 8s
0
2 B; 9s 2 A; s  s
0
or s and s
0
inomparable
(not(s 3 s
0
) and not(s
0
3 s
0
)).
4.2 Axiomatis for Disrimax Possibility and
Big-Stepped Probabilities
Condene relations of Setion 3 an be onstruted
from the basi ondene relation formed by their re-
strition to singletons { in these ases, this restrition
is a weak order 3. But the relations under onern
do not display the behavior of an OM-relation for all
pairs of events. Nevertheless, the OM-relation  sim-
ply generated by 3 is at least embedded in the on-
dene relation in the sense of the following property:
Compatibility of  with Order of Magnitude
(COM) 8A;B  S;AB =) A  B
where  is the OM-relation that onsistent with 3.
COM ensures the minimal requirement stating that, if
the order of magnitude of the ondene in A is stritly
higher than the one in B (i.e. if B is negligible w.r.t.
A), then A must be more likely than B.
An interesting ase is when  is preadditive. The on-
juntion of COM and ADD indues eteris paribus
ondene relations with embedded negligibility, as
appears in the disrimax likelihood model. In this
ase the restrition of  to disjoint subsets is an OM-
relation, namely: :
Ceteris Paribus Order of Magnitude (CPOM)
8A;B  S suh that A \ B = ;, AB () A  B
It is obvious that CPOM =) COM. If the pread-
ditivity axiom is veried, the entire relation an be
obtained from its restrition to disjoint events. Un-
fortunately, Theorem 1 shows that for OM-relations,
NEG is not ompatible with preadditivity when  is
transitive. Two dierent diretions an be followed to
obviate this onit:
 Requiring the equivalene between  and  on
disjoints sets only (CPOM). In this ase, the tran-
sitivity of  is lost.
 Requiring the transitivity of  (i.e. a omparative
probability). In this ase, it is no more possible
to ensure that  is a loseness relation, even on
disjoint sets. So, CPOM is relaxed into COM.
The following results show that, when the relation on
singletons is a weak order, the rst option is harater-
isti of the disrimax likelihood relation and, for the
transitive ase, big-stepped probabilities an be har-
aterized by COM.
Theorem 5 Let  be a ondene relation. The fol-
lowing properties are equivalent:
  9 suh that 8A;B, A  B () A 
L
B
   is preadditive, omplete, satises CPOM, and
its restrition to singletons is a weak order.
Theorem 6 Let  be a monotoni ondene rela-
tion. The following properties are equivalent:
  There exists a big-stepped probability P suh that
8A;B;A  B () P (A)  P (B)
   is a preadditive weak order and satises COM.
Interestingly, the latter result shows that, while om-
parative probability relations are more general than
(hene not representable by) numerial probabilities,
it is when omparative probabilities get lose to pos-
sibility relations, exhibiting negligibility eets, that
they always have a quantitative representation (as big-
stepped probabilities).
4.3 Lexiographi Probabilities
Lehmann (1996) denes generalized omparative prob-
abilities that exhibit negligibility eets but esape the
previous framework beause they do not obey COM.
Within this generalization of omparative probabili-
ties, the negligibility relation is not built from a ba-
si relation on states, like in possibility theory or
Halpern's approah. Let us fous on the important
lass of probabilities suggested by Blume et al. (1991),
alled lexiographi probabilities, enountered in Se-
tion 3.2.
Let 3 be a lexiographi probability relation underly-
ing a well-ordered partition S
1
; S
2
; : : : ; S
n
of S. Con-
sider the restrition 3
P
of 3 on P = fS
1
; S
2
; : : : ; S
n
g
as a (generalized) basi relation. An OM-relation 
P
an be simply generated from 3
P
on a sub-algebra B
of 2
S
ontaining subsets of S formed of unions of S
0
i
s:
A
P
B , 8S
i
 B; 9S
j
 A S
j
 S
i
.

P
is then extended to all events 2
S
, as follows:
A
P
B () A


P
B

,
where A

= [fS
i
; S
i
\ A 6= ;g is the upper approxi-
mation of A in B in the sense of rough set theory. The
integer i = minfj : S
j
\ A 6= ;g is the rank of A: the
lower the rank of A the higher the order of magnitude
of its plausibility. The ompatibility of a ondene
relation  with the OM-relation 
P
then writes:
COM
P
8A;B  S;A
P
B =) A  B
Lexiographi probabilities are obviously omparative
probabilities that satisfy COM
P
. For regular ompar-
ative probabilities (exhibiting no negligibility eet),
the subalgebra B redues to f;; Sg, and A
P
B ()
A = S and B = ;.
Conversely, it an be shown that, given a partition P of
S, any omparative probability  satisfying COM
P
is
a lexiographi one. The lexiographi probability or-
der an be reonstruted as follows: 3
P
is the subpart
of  that ompares elements of P and eah regular
omparative probability 
i
on 2
S
i
is the restrition of
 to subsets of S
i
. It an then be shown that A  B if
either A


P
B

, or A

=
P
B

(i.e. A and B have the
same rank i), and then A \ S
i

i
B \ S
i
. A question
for further researh is whether all omplete generalized
probabilities in the sense of Lehmann satisfy COM
P
.
Also, relationships between OM- relations, innitesi-
mal probabilities and onditioning over sets of measure
0 look natural to investigate (see Halpern, 2001).
5 Conlusion
The aim of our work was to learly lay bare onne-
tions between probability and possibility theories, by
means of axiomati haraterizations and representa-
tion results. Unsurprisingly, lexiographi orderings lie
at the rossroads. Casting preadditivity and negligi-
bility inside the axiomati deision theory framework,
nonstandard utilities or big-stepped utilities are also
obtained on top of probabilities. It leads either to de-
ision riteria whih are generalized Condoret voting
rules (Dubois et al., 2003), or to additive renements
of possibilisti riteria representable by (big-stepped)
expeted utility (Fargier and Sabbadin, 2003).
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